Dynamic epistemic logic as viewed by Baltag, Moss and Solecki (BMS) and propositional dynamic logic (PDL) offer different semantics of events. On the one hand, BMS adds dynamics to epistemic logic by introducing so-called event models as syntactic objects into the language. On the other hand, PDL has instead transition relations between possible worlds. This last approach allows to easily introduce converse events. In this paper we add epistemics to this, and call the resulting logic epistemic dynamic logic (EDL). We show that BMS can be translated into EDL thanks to this use of the converse operator: it enables us to translate the structure of the event model directly within a particular axiomatization of EDL, without having to refer to a particular epistemic event model in the language (as done in BMS). It follows that EDL is more expressive and general than BMS and we characterize semantically and syntactically in EDL this embedding of BMS.
Introduction
Aim: reason about perception of events. Accounting for various modes of perception of events is the aim of a family of formal systems called dynamic epistemic logics. These logics add dynamics to Hintikka's epistemic logic via transformations of its models.
The focus of dynamic epistemic logics is typically on epistemic events. The simplest case of epistemic event is public announcementà la Plaza [15] . Another example is group announcementà la Gerbrandy [9] . Note that updates of dynamic epistemic logics differ from Katsuno-Mendelzon-like updates as studied in the AI literature [12] since these updates always involve a factual change in the situation at stake.
In [6, 5] , Baltag, Moss and Solecki proposed a dynamic epistemic logic that was very influential. We refer to it in this paper by the term BMS. It has been shown that their account subsumes all other dynamic epistemic logics. Organization of the paper. This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce a language of belief, events and converse events. Then we provide a semantics for that language, and define our logic EDL. In section 3 we give BMS's restricted product semantics for the fragment of the language without converse, and define its logic, also called BMS. In section 4 we provide two embeddings of BMS into EDL: a 'semantic' one and a 'syntactic' one based on a theory Γ(A) associated to each event model A (we prove that the consequences of Γ(A) in EDL match the BMS-validities). In section 5 we compare our formalism with van Benthem and Pacuit's logic ETL and other related work. Finally, we conclude in section 6.
EDL: Epistemic Dynamic Logic with converse

The language L EDL of EDL
In this paper, Φ is a countable set of propositional symbols, G is a finite set of agent symbols, and E is a finite set of event symbols. (Finiteness of E will be crucial for our results, cf. Definition 2.5.)
Definition 2.1 (Language L EDL )
The language L EDL is defined as follows
where p ranges over Φ, j over G and a over E. 
Semantics of EDL
When designing models of events and beliefs the central issue is to account for the interplay between these two concepts. In our PDL-based semantics this is done by means of constraints on the respective accessibility relations.
Definition 2.2 (EDL-model, no-forgetting, no-learning, epistemic determinism) An EDL-model is a tuple M = (W, R, R, V ) such that
• W is a non-empty set of possible worlds;
• R : G → 2 W ×W assigns an accessibility relation to each agent;
• R : E → 2 W ×W assigns an accessibility relation to each possible event; and
W is a valuation.
We write R j and R a instead of R(j) and R(a), and define R j (w) = {v | wR j v} and R −1
a (v)} = {w | v ∈ R a (w)}. Moreover an EDL-model satisfies the constraints of no-forgetting, no-learning and epistemic determinism:
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The no-forgetting principle says that if after an event a agent j considers a world v ′ possible, then before this event a agent j already considered possible that there was an event b leading to this world (see Figure 1 , left). So everything agent j considers possible after the performance of an event stems from what she considered possible before the event. This principle is a generalization of the perfect-recall principle [8] .
To understand the no-learning principle, also known as no miracles [24] , assume that agent j perceives the occurrence of a as that of b 1 , b 2 . . . or b n . Then, informally, the no-learning principle says that all such alternatives resulting from occurrence of b 1 , b 2 ,. . . , b n in j's alternatives before a are indeed alternatives after a. In a sense there is no miracles: everything the agent was supposed to consider possible after the event is indeed considered possible after the event (if the latter actually takes place). Formally, assume that agent j perceives b as a possible alternative of a, i.e.
′ was a possible outcome of event b for j, then v ′ is possible for j at some v ∈ R a (w) (see Figure 1, middle) .
Finally, the epistemic determinism principle says that an agent's epistemic state after an event does not depend on the particular nondeterministic outcome. Formally, suppose we have wR a v 1 and wR a v 2 . Then ed forces that the epistemic states at v 1 and v 2 are identical: Figure 1 , right).
These three constraints delimit the class of events E we consider. Our events are such that the epistemic state of an agent after the occurrence of an event depends only on the previous epistemic state of the agent and on how the event is perceived by the agent, and not on which facts hold in the world before or after the event. This feature of our events is formally captured by Proposition 2.3 below: R j (w) is the epistemic state of the agent before the nf : Figure 1 : no-forgetting, no-learning and epistemic determinism constraints event and
is intuitively the set of events that agent j considers as possibly occurring while event a is in fact occurring at world w. For example the event of an agent testing whether φ is the case is not an event of the set of atomic events E. Indeed the epistemic state of this agent after the test (the agent knowing whether φ is true) depends on the actual state of the world (whether φ is true or not). In this example the no-learning constraint is violated. Another example of an event which is not dealt with by our formalism is that of tossing a coin and looking at it. In this example, the epistemic state of the agent after the toss depends on the state of the world after the event, i.e. whether the coin lands heads or tails up. Here the epistemic determinism constraint is violated. On the other hand, both public and private announcements are dealt with by our framework. More generally, any kind of announcement (public, private. . . ) about any kind of information (epistemic, stating that an event just occurred. . . ) is dealt with by our framework. Our events are sometimes called ontic events, feedback-free events or uninformative events [11, 7] .
where
PROOF.
• Assume M satisfies nf, nl and ed.
• Assume M satisfies (*).
ed is clearly fulfilled.
QED
Definition 2.4 (Truth conditions for L EDL )
The semantics of L EDL is defined inductively as follows. Let M be an EDLmodel and w ∈ M .
Truth of φ in a EDL-model M is written M |= φ and is defined as: M, w |= φ for every w ∈ M . Let Γ be a set of L EDL -formulas. Validity of φ in a class of EDL-models M is written M |= φ and is defined as M |= φ for all M ∈ M. The (global) consequence relation is defined by: 
Conv 1 and Conv 2 are the standard conversion axioms of tense logic and converse PDL. NF, NL and ED respectively axiomatize no-forgetting, no-learning and epistemic determinism.
We write Γ ⊢ EDL φ when φ is provable from the set of formulas Γ in this axiomatics.
One can then show that EDL is strongly complete:
PROOF. The proof follows from Sahlqvist's theorem [18] : all our axioms NF, NL, ED are of the required form, and match the respective constraints nf, nl, ed.
QED
BMS: Static models, Event models, and their products
We here present a star-free version of Baltag's dynamic epistemic logic BMS without the iteration operator * and without common belief [4, 3] . We have the same sets of propositional symbols Φ, agent symbols G and event symbols E. We recall that as before, G and E are finite.
Semantics
Static models are standard epistemic models of the form M s = (W, R, V ), where W is a set of possible worlds, R : G → 2 W ×W assigns an accessibility relation to each agent, and V : Φ → 2 W is a valuation.
Event models are of the form A = (E, R, P re)
, where E is a finite set of possible events, R : G → 2 E×E assigns an accessibility relation to each agent, P re : E → L is a precondition function associating epistemic formulas to possible events.
Intuitive interpretation. Informally, P re(a) is the precondition that a world must fulfill so that the event a can take place in this world. For example P re(a) = ⊤ means that event a can take place in any world. When we have R j (a) = {b} then the occurrence of a is perceived by agent j as the occurrence of b; when R j (a) = {b 1 , b 2 } then the occurrence of a is perceived by agent j indistinguishably as the occurrence of b 1 or b 2 ; etc.
Product construction. Given a static model
A is a static model describing the situation after the event described by A occurred in M s :
where the new set of possible worlds is
, and the new static accessibility relation is defined by
While the truth condition for the epistemic operator is just as in Hintikka's epistemic logic and in EDL, the product construction gives a semantics to the [a] operator which is quite different from that of PDL and EDL. It highlights that BMS is a dynamic extension of epistemic logic, while EDL is an epistemic extension of PDL.
Finally, validity of φ in BMS (noted |= BMS φ) is defined as usual as truth in every world of every BMS-model. Note that validity means validity w.r.t. a fixed event model A.
Completeness
Suppose we are given an event model A. The axiomatics of BMS is made up of the principles of the multi-modal logic K for the modal operators B j and [a], together with the following axioms [4, 3] .
We write ⊢ BMS φ when φ is provable from these principles. Note that this axiomatization depends on a particular event model A. (We might have writ-
For example for every event model A where P re(a) = ⊤, P re(b) = p, and
From BMS to EDL
In this section we provide two embeddings of BMS into EDL: a 'semantic' one (section 4.1) and a 'syntactic' one (section 4.2). This duality will allow us to state a representation theorem in section 4.3 relating these two equivalent characterizations of BMS in EDL.
For the syntactic embedding we will use a particular EDL-theory that encodes syntactically the structure of a given BMS event model A.
Definition 4.1 (Theory of an event model)
Let A = (E, R, P re) be an event model. The theory of A, written Γ(A), is made up of the following non-logical axioms:
(2) ⟨a⟩⊤ ↔ P re(a), for every a ∈ E;
where a 1 , . . . , a n is the list of all a i such that a i ∈ R j (a), and Example 4.2 Consider that G = {i, j} and Φ = {p}. In Figure 2 we recall the event models A 1 and A 2 corresponding respectively to the public announcement of φ and the private announcement of φ to A, where φ ∈ L. Here, P re(a) = φ in both models and P re(b) = ⊤.
Public announcement of φ :
Private announcement of φ to i: 
A 'semantic' embedding
We first introduce the notion of forest generated in the BMS style by a static model and an event model (which is just as in Yap's construction [28] ).
Definition 4.3 Let M
s be a static model and A an event model. We define the tuple F orest EDL 
where 
is an EDL-model is standard. So we only prove the second part of the proposition. Conditions (1) and (2) of Definition 4.1 are clearly fulfilled. As for condition (3) PROOF. We first prove a lemma. PROOF. We prove it by induction on k.
QED
For any formula φ we define the integer δ(φ) as the maximum number of nested event operator occurrences as follows:
where M s is the static model and M k is the iteration of the product construction.
We prove P(k) for all k by induction on k.
We prove it by induction on φ.
• φ = [a]φ ′ . We have the following cases:
• φ = φ 1 ∧ φ 2 works by Induction Hypothesis.
• φ = B j φ ′ works as well.
• φ = p is impossible because k + 1 ≥ 1.
Then we can easily prove that for all φ such that
As a corollary of Proposition 4.5 we get the following 'semantic' embedding of BMS into EDL.
Theorem 4.7 Let
A be an event model, and let φ ∈ L BMS . Then
This theorem illustrates formally the intuition that the fragment of the class of EDL-models that embeds the BMS semantics is the class of EDL-models F orest EDL (A).
A 'syntactic' embedding
In this section we prove that Γ(A) correctly encodes the event model A from a syntactic point of view, in the sense that for every formula φ ∈ L BMS ,
To do so, we first prove that the axiom of determinism stated in the following proposition is a logical consequence of Γ(A) in EDL . This is comforting because the axiom of determinism is indeed valid in BMS .
Proposition 4.8 Let A be an event model. For every φ ∈ L BMS we have Γ(A) |=
PROOF. Let A = (E, R, P re) be a given event model, and let M be an EDLmodel such that M |= ψ for every ψ ∈ Γ(A). Assume w 0 R a v 0 and w 0 R a u 0 with v 0 ̸ = u 0 . We are going to show that u 0 and v 0 are bisimilar.
Z
e is defined to be an epistemic bisimulation between models M 1 and M 2 if Z e is a bisimulation between the restriction of these models to epistemic accessibility relations. Let Z e := {(w, w) : w ∈ W } ∪ {(v 0 , u 0 )}. We are going to show that Z e is an epistemic bisimulation. To do so, we need to prove
(1) is guaranteed by the first item of Definition 4.1. (2) and (3) are guaranteed by epistemic determinism: ed makes that R j (u 0 ) = R j (v 0 ). Now from Z e , we are going to build up a bisimulation. We proceed as follows.
We are going to show that Z is a bisimulation.
1. We first show that Z is an epistemic bisimulation: we prove by induction on n that every Z n is an epistemic bisimulation.
We have already proved that Z 0 is an epistemic bisimulation. Assume it is true for Z n and
So for all n ∈ N, Z n is an epistemic bisimulation. Henceforth Z is also an epistemic bisimulation.
2. Now we are going to show that Z is a full bisimulation. Assume uZv for some u, v ∈ W . Then uZ n v for some n ∈ N.
u |= P re(a) by Definition 4.1 (2). So M, v |= P re(a) because Z is an epistemic bisimulation and P re(a) ∈ L
C .
So there is v
QED Now, we prove the two directions of ( * * * ) by means of two propositions. PROOF. We take advantage of the complete axiomatization of BMS-validities given in [4, 3] , and show that the BMS-axioms are EDL-valid, and that the BMS-inference rules preserve EDL-validity. As the inference rules of BMS and EDL are identical (i.e. modus ponens and necessitation) it is clear that the BMSinference rules preserve EDL-theoremhood. It is straightforward to show that every instance of the BMS-axioms not involving dynamic operators is EDLvalid. So what remains is to prove that the BMS schemas
Proposition 4.9 Let
where a 1 , . . . , a n is the list of all a i such that aR j a i , are logical consequences of Γ(A) in EDL. 
Now, by the nonlogical axiom 4.1 (3) we have
) , where a 1 , . . . , a n is the list of all a i such that a i ∈ R j (a) and
′ |= EDL ¬φ, which is contradictory.
QED
Putting these two results together we obtain the following 'syntactic' embedding of BMS into EDL. 
A representation theorem
Theorems 4.7 and 4.11 give us two characterizations of the BMS logic within EDL. A semantic one: F orest EDL (A), and a syntactic one: Γ(A). From these two results we get easily the following representation theorem.
Theorem 4.12 Let M be an EDL-model and A be an event model.
M |= Γ(A) iff M is bisimilar to some EDL-model of F orest EDL (A).
PROOF. The right to left direction follows from Proposition 4.4. The left to right direction follows easily from Theorems 4.7 and 4.11.
QED
Comparison with ETL and other related work
Another approach studying information change over time is Epistemic Temporal Logic ETL [14] (or equivalently interpreted systems [8] as shown by Pacuit [13] ). In this section we are going to compare EDL with ETL from the standpoint of [13, 24, 21] where converse events are introduced as well. We will also study their relationships with the BMS framework and some of its extensions.
Basics of ETL
Let Σ be any set. Elements of Σ are called events, and elements of the set of finite strings Σ * histories. For any two sets X and Y , XY is the set of sequences consisting of an object in X followed by one in Y . Given h ∈ Σ * , the length of h (len(h)) is the number of events in h.
Let λ be the empty string. For a set of histories H ⊆ Σ * , FinPre −λ (H) = {h | h is non-empty and there is h
Definition 5.1 Let Σ be any set of events. A protocol is a set H ⊆ Σ * with
H×H assigns an accessibility relation R(j) = R j to each agent j ∈ G, and V : Φ → 2 H is a valuation. 2
So note that in an ETL-model events are deterministic which is not necessarily the case in an EDL-model. The language of ETL is the same as the language L EDL of EDL. Truth conditions are defined as usual and we only recall those for the temporal operators.
•
ETL-models might satisfy additional constraints listed below.
Definition 5.2 Let T = (Σ, H, R, V ) be an ETL-model. T satisfies:
• Propositional Stability iff for all h ∈ H, a ∈ Σ, h |= p iff ha |= p;
Now, given a static model M s and an event model A, one can naturally define an ETL-model generated in the BMS style, very similarly to the way we defined an EDL-model generated in the BMS style in Definition 4.3. • Σ = W ∪ E; , a 1 ) , . . .), a n ));
2
The following representation theorem sets some connections between ETL and BMS. It is the counterpart in ETL of our representation Theorem 4.12. However, the right to left direction of this theorem does not hold in general if we use the standard BMS framework [4, 3] used in this paper (in particular if we assume that T is infinite). Indeed to prove this theorem, the preconditions of the event model A might involve infinite conjunctions and disjunctions of epistemic formulae and not a single epistemic formula as in our paper and in [4, 3] . We are going to need this assumption in the 2nd item of Definition 4.1.
Theorem 5.4 [23] An ETL-model T is of the form
ETL and EDL
To compare EDL and ETL we need a notion of 'equivalence' between EDLmodels and ETL-models. It is captured here formally by the notion of DTbisimulation defined as follows.
Definition 5.5 Let M = (W, R, R, V ) be an EDL-model and T = (Σ, H, R, V )
be an ETL-model. Let Z be a relation between W and H. We define the property of Z being a DT-bisimulation in w ∈ W and h ∈ H, noted Z : M, w DT T, h, as follows:
• If wZh and w
• If wZh and h
• If wZh and w ′ ∈ R a (w) then there exists h ′ ∈ H such that h ≺ a h ′ and w ′ Zh ′ .
• If wZh and
We say that M, w and T, h are DT-bisimilar, noted M,
Naturally, two 'equivalent' models satisfy the same formulas:
Proposition 5.6 Let M be an EDL-model and T be an ETL-model, w ∈ M and
We can now express formally that F orest EDL and F orest ETL are 'equivalent' constructions. PROOF. We just give the corresponding ETL-and EDL-models. The proof that they satisfy perfect recall, weak no miracles and determinism is routine.
Proposition 5.7 Let
Let M = (W, R, R , V ) be an EDL-model satisfying determinism, and let w ∈ W . We define the corresponding ETL-model T = (Σ, H, R, V ) as follows.
• Σ = E;
We write
. This makes sense because M satisfies determinism.
QED
In fact, note that perfect recall is the ETL-version of our no-forgetting principle and weak no miracles is the ETL-version of our no learning principle. Propositional stability holds because of the first item of Definition 4.1. Perfect recall holds by Proposition 5.8. We now check that no miracles and bisimulation invariance hold.
No Miracles
So by the no-learning constraint
Bisimulation invariance Let h, h
′ ∈ H which are epistemically bisimilar such that ha ∈ H. Then we have h = wa 1 . . . a n and h ′ = wa
QED
Note that the converse of Proposition 5.9 does not hold in general for the same reason that the right to left direction of Theorem 5.4 does not hold in general if we adopt the standard BMS framework.
Other related work
Still in the ETL paradigm the authors in [26] show how to translate a BMS formula satisfied in a static model into an ETL formula satisfied in an interpreted system. So their approach is less general than ours because it only deals with the model checking problem. Starting from the BMS formalism, Yap [28] and Sack [17, 16] introduce a 'yesterday' temporal modal operator to the BMS language expressing what was true before the last event; Sack gets a complete characterization. To prove completeness Sack [16] also introduces a separate component expressing that an event just occurred but this is not a converse modal operator like ours. However he does introduce a converse modal operator for public announcement logic but does not provide a completeness proof for it [17] . Another approach embedding the BMS formalism to a formalism that also deals with events and beliefs on the same formal level is proposed by van Eijck et col. in [27, 25] . They map the BMS formalism to (epistemic) propositional dynamic logic (refining a similar result for automata propositional dynamic logic [22] ). However they do not resort to converse events and translate directly event models into a transformation on PDL programs.
In a previous publication of ours [2] , the constraint of no-forgetting and condition (3) where a 1 , . . . , a n is the list of all b such that b ∈ R j (a).
Neither do EDL models satisfy nf', nor the other way round. Hence the version of EDL in [2] cannot be compared with our present version. If we moreover assume that event models are serial then we obtain the same results as here.
Here we do not need this last assumption and our condition (3) describes more accurately than (3)' the structure of event models. Our constraint nf is also a better generalization of the principle of perfect-recall than nf'.
Conclusion
We have presented an epistemic dynamic logic EDL whose semantics differs from the BMS semantics. We have shown that BMS can be embedded into EDL. This result allows to conclude that EDL is an interesting alternative to Baltag et al.'s logic, that allows to talk about agents' perception of events just in the same way as BMS does. However, EDL is more expressive than BMS because it allows to talk about past events. Another of its advantages is that EDL allows for incomplete beliefs about the event taking place and can still draw inferences from this incomplete description of the event, while in BMS the event model has to specify everything. So in a sense EDL seems more versatile than BMS to describe events. On the other hand, the power of event models (actually called action models in BMS) is not completely exploited in the BMS approach. Indeed, the philosophy of the BMS approach is to represent events in the same way as situations are represented in epistemic logic by means of static models. But unlike a static model, an event model does not have a genuine valuation to describe possible events. An obvious extension of the BMS formalism would be to add a valuation to event models in order to describe possible events more precisely. Then we could define epistemic languages for event models completely identical to the various epistemic languages we already defined for static models, except that the propositional letters of these languages would describe possible events instead of possible worlds. This would allow to express things about events that are currently taking place, and not only to express things before or after the occurrence of events as in EDL. This would also allow to update/revise events by other events which is a phenomenon that often occurs in everyday life.It is not possible to model such phenomena in EDL because the accessibility relations for events are set once and for all. This idea is explored in [1] .
